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Briefing given by General Carter  
on 11 September to Foreign and  
Military affairs Committee of House

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*OCI memo prepared  
for A/DCI to use in  
briefing Congress, 12 Sept 62*

11 September 1962

[ ] BRIEFING

## RECENT SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

I.

[ ] ex-  
tensive Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in recent weeks.

A. These have included surface-to-air (SAM) missiles,  
guided missile boats, at least one and probably more  
MIG-21 (FISHBED) jet fighter aircraft, and additional  
land armaments.

II. Twelve SAM sites are being set up, and SAM equipment has  
been tentatively identified at one additional site. One  
probable missile assembly area has been identified.

A. The small amount of permanent construction at these  
sites and the speed of the work indicate that the  
program is proceeding on a crash basis.

B. Some of these sites could be operational very soon.

C. At least 125 technically trained personnel will be  
required to operate each site, which includes six  
launchers and radar and electronic gear.

1. This figure excludes security and support  
personnel.

2. We have seen no indication that Cubans have been  
trained for operation of SAMs. Soviet personnel  
will doubtless man the sites for at least the 9  
to 12 months while Cubans are being trained.

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

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- III. The Soviet SAM system is estimated to have a slant range of about 25 nautical miles.
- A. The high altitude capability of the system would be in the region of 60,000 to 80,000 feet--or, if the newest version has been supplied to Cuba--in the region of 80,000 to 100,000 feet.
- B. Low altitude capability is estimated as low as 2,500 feet, but maximum effectiveness of the system would probably be between 10,000 and 60,000 feet.
- IV. Additional SAM sites probably are being or soon will be set up in Cuba.
- A. The pattern now emerging suggests that as many as 24 sites--enough to provide modern anti-aircraft defense for the entire island--may eventually be set up.
1. The 12 sites already confirmed could cover almost the entire western half of Cuba.
- V. At least eight Komar-class missile boats have been delivered to Cuba in recent weeks.
- A. These PT-like boats have a maximum speed of 43 knots and a radius of about 325 nautical miles at 20 knots.
1. They carry two missile launchers each; the missiles are primarily designed to attack surface vessels but can be used for shore bombardment. The useful range of the missiles is 15 to 17 miles. They carry 2,000 pound high-explosive warheads.


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B. These boats are in addition to 13 or more motor torpedo boats and six Kronshtadt-class subchasers delivered by the USSR to Cuba earlier this year.

VI.



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Soviet-made MIG-21 (FISHBED) jet fighter aircraft at a Cuban airfield. We have indications that there may be at least 13 more still unassembled at this airfield.


A. This is the first confirmation of a MIG-21 in Cuba.

1. The MIG-21 has a speed in excess of 1,000 miles per hour and is normally armed with two air-to-air missiles as well as rockets and cannon.

2. Prior to the recent arrivals, Cuba is believed to have had about 60 MIG fighters, including MIG-15's, MIG-17's, and at least a dozen supersonic MIG-19's (FARMERS).


B. No Soviet-made bombers have been noted.

VII. Soviet military deliveries show no sign of letting up.



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
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


1. The total number of military or military-related shipments to Cuba since the current deliveries began in mid-July may be as high as 65.
2. Routine Soviet shipments of economic aid and trade goods to Cuba are now largely coming on chartered Western vessels.

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X. Moscow's pronouncement yesterday that a US attack on Cuba could lead to global war is the strongest display of verbal support for Castro since Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy in April 1961 which warned that the USSR would do whatever was necessary to repulse such an attack.

A. The tone of the Soviet statement (which is tough) and its thrust (which is to disclaim that Moscow is doing anything more than the US is doing in areas sensitive to the Bloc) suggests the Russians are anxious to deter the US from taking any drastic action against Cuba.

B. There is no sure way of telling whether the Soviets are bluffing, but we note they have left themselves some convenient loopholes in the implied pledge to defend Castro.

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1. Thus, while they talk of taking "all measures to ensure that our armed forces are brought to the highest state of military preparedness," they have been careful to add the caveat that "however, these are exclusively precautionary measures."

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